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CONTROL OVER DISPUTE-SYSTEM 
DESIGN AND MANDATORY 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
LISA B. BINGHAM* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “mandatory arbitration” has come to refer to binding arbitra-
tion imposed by the stronger party on the weaker in an economic relationship 
through an adhesive contract clause.1  Scholars have identified emerging pat-
terns in how arbitration is viewed and regulated based on whether the parties 
are repeat or one-shot players in the arbitration system.2  As amply docu-
mented in this Symposium, critics have identified a series of concerns regarding 
the fairness of mandatory arbitration systems, including lack of consent, lack of 
due process, privatization of public law, shifting costs, and others.  This Article 
argues that mandatory arbitration is not itself the problem.  The problem is 
instead that in some instances, one party to the dispute has exclusive control of 
the design of the dispute-resolution system.  Consequently, research on 
mandatory arbitration should concentrate on who is structuring it, how they 
structure it, why this is so, and how these choices affect dispute outcomes. 
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 1. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A 
Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1249 (2001) (describing mandatory arbitration as “imposed 
on the consumer with an absence of any meaningful choice”).  The term has been criticized as 
misleading, since no one mandates the purchase of the good or service to which adhesive arbitration 
attaches.  For more discussion on this point, see Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration 
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 706. 
 2. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 759, 760 (2001) (arguing that there are two types of arbitration that deserve different 
regulatory treatment: that practiced among repeat players, such as merchants, and that between repeat 
players and one-shot players, such as consumers). 
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Dispute systems vary across two separate dimensions of disputant self-
determination or control:3 control over the overall system design, and control 
within a given case using a specific process provided by the overall system 
design.  Professors Ury, Brett, and Goldberg coined the phrase “dispute system 
design” to describe an organization’s conscious effort to channel disputes into a 
series of steps or options to manage conflict.4  Organizational dispute-system 
designs can take myriad forms, including a single, multi-step procedure 
culminating in mediation or arbitration, ombudspersons5 programs giving 
disputants many different process choices, or simply a single-step, binding 
arbitration design.6 
Control over dispute-system design includes making choices regarding 
which cases are subject to the process, which process or sequential processes 
are available (mediation, early neutral evaluation, or binding arbitration, for 
example), which due process rules apply, and other structural aspects of a 
private justice system.  Control at the case level includes the process and 
outcome, such as whether within a discrete dispute the process results in a 
voluntary, negotiated settlement agreement or an imposed, binding, third-party 
decision. 
Discussions of self-determination in appropriate or alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) typically focus on the disputants’ control over the process 
 
 3. For purposes of this discussion, I use the term “control” to discuss the dispute-system design 
level of analysis.  I have previously used the terms “self-determination” and “control” synonymously, 
recognizing that in other contexts, authors may distinguish between the two.  See Lisa B. Bingham, 
Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873 
(2002). 
 4. See WILLIAM L. URY, ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT 
THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 42 (1988). 
 5. An ombudsperson program is an organizational dispute system design in which one person, 
generally with direct access to upper management, serves as a contact point for all streams of conflict 
in the organization and assists employees and consumers with identifying an appropriate process for 
addressing disputes.  See CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY 
ORGANIZATIONS (1996). 
 6. For further discussion of dispute-system designs for managing conflicts among customers, 
business partners, and suppliers, and other non-employment conflicts, see COSTANTINO & 
MERCHANT, supra note 5. 
Dispute-system design is not an activity exclusively undertaken by organizations.  In environmental 
conflict resolution, which is characterized by the participation of many parties representing diverse 
stakeholders, dispute-system design is essentially the first phase of the process.  See generally THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 61-168 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (discussing issues of 
who designs and structures a consensus process, the design phase, and the design committee).  
Similarly, courts and administrative agencies engage in dispute-system design when they adopt 
alternative dispute resolution programs.  For extensive background on dispute-system design efforts in 
the federal government, see the Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group 
webpage, at http://www.adr.gov/ (last updated May 28, 2004).  For evaluation reports reflecting the 
results of dispute-system design efforts in the federal courts, see the webpage of the Federal Judicial 
Center, at http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_r=pages/556&url_l=index 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2003).  For similar reports reflecting dispute-system designs in state courts, see the 
website of the National Center for State Courts, at http://www.ncsconline.org (last visited Oct. 23, 
2003). 
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and outcome in the particular dispute, mostly in the context of mediation.7  
Mediator ethics codes, for example, focus on mediators’ obligation not to 
coerce parties to agree to a particular settlement.8  Self-determination is not a 
salient component of arbitrator codes of ethics.  Rather, the codes focus on 
conflicts of interest and due process during the hearing.9  The process that 
brings parties to the mediation table or arbitration hearing is often left implicit. 
More recently, there has been discussion of the ethical obligations of pro-
vider organizations—those public, private, and nonprofit agencies and 
organizations that provide neutral dispute-resolution services for multiple 
parties and cases.10  Proposed codes of ethics impose upon these organizations 
various duties to ensure the fairness and impartiality of dispute-resolution 
processes and the quality and competence of neutrals, with a sliding scale of 
responsibility based on the measure of control exercised by the provider 
organization.11  These discussions, however, do not distinguish between self-
determination at the case level and its relationship to control over dispute-
system design. 
ADR processes vary depending on who is designing them, their purpose, 
and the resulting design.  Table 1 is an effort to illustrate variations in control 
over the outcome at the case level and control over overall dispute-system 
design. 
 
 7. For examples, see DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 1-118 (Phyllis 
Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002).  Current rules on self-determination are summarized in James J. 
Alfini, Mediator Ethics, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS, supra, at 65. 
 8. Alfini, supra note 7, at 73-74. 
 9. See The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
ETHICS, supra note 7, app. C, at 275; JAMS Ethics Guidelines for Arbitrators, in DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION ETHICS, supra note 7, app. E, at 307.  For a discussion and synthesis of various ethical 
codes for arbitrators, see Richard Chernick & Kimberly Taylor, Ethical Issues Specific to Arbitration, 
in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 179.  Chernick and Taylor devote two sections to 
party control over the design of the arbitration, one identifying due process concerns for adhesive 
arbitration imposed by one party on the other, and a second discussing assistance to parties with 
process choices.  Id. at 199, 202-03.  Neither identifies control or self-determination as to dispute-
system design as a separate dimension of arbitral ethics. 
 10. See, e.g., Sharon Press, Ethics for Provider Organizations, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS, 
supra note 7, at 155; CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in ADR, in 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS, supra note 7, app. G, at 315. 
 11. Press, supra note 10, at 158-68. 
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TABLE 1: 
SELF-DETERMINATION AT THE CASE LEVEL AND  
CONTROL IN DISPUTE-SYSTEM DESIGN 
 
                                                   Self-determination in 
                                               Individual Case 
  
 
Parties Control Outcome Third Party Controls 
Outcome 
 
 
Both/All 
Parties 
A. Ad hoc mediation; 
Ad hoc, nonbinding, 
evaluative processes 
D. Ad hoc arbitration; 
Negotiated, binding 
processes 
 
Control over 
System Design 
One 
Party 
B. Mandatory or 
voluntary mediation; 
Mandatory or voluntary, 
nonbinding processes 
E. Adhesive, binding 
arbitration 
 Third 
Party 
C. Court-annexed 
mediation or nonbinding 
processes 
(mandatory or voluntary); 
Administrative 
agency mediation 
F. Court or 
administrative 
adjudication; 
Legislated, binding 
arbitration 
 
Cell A, B, and C each addresses a different distribution of control over 
dispute-system design in mediation and other nonbinding processes in which 
the parties retain control over the outcome at the case level.  These are arm’s 
length-negotiated mediation, adhesive mediation or advisory evaluative 
processes structured by one party, and court-connected mediation and 
nonbinding ADR. 
Cells D, E, and F address a different distribution of control over dispute-
system designs that include various forms of binding arbitration—an ADR 
process in which the parties cede control over the outcome to a third party, who 
issues a binding decision subject to limited judicial review.  These three levels 
include arm’s length-negotiated use of binding arbitration, adhesive binding 
arbitration imposed by a stronger contracting party on a weaker one, and 
binding arbitration imposed by an authoritative third party, such as a legislative 
body. Commentators have distinguished between two-party and one-party 
designs in discussions of how courts and legislatures should respond to 
changing uses of commercial arbitration.12 
 
 12. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 171 (2003) (arguing that mutually negotiated, arm’s length agreements to expand the 
scope of judicial review for arbitration should be enforced, but arguing against enforcement of 
standard-form contracts for consumer goods). 
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This Article addresses control in dispute-system designs in the context of 
binding commercial arbitration.13  It argues that control in dispute-system 
design has a significant impact on the structure and operation of the resulting 
system.14  Part II examines selected uses of commercial arbitration in which 
both or all parties control the dispute-system design.  Part III examines man-
datory commercial arbitration when one party controls the dispute-system 
design.  Part IV contrasts uses of commercial arbitration in which a third party 
designs the system for the benefit of the disputants.  These three sections are 
not an exhaustive catalogue of the varieties of arbitration under each form of 
dispute-system design; they simply illustrate patterns.  The Article concludes 
with a call for empirical research on the impact of control over dispute-system 
design on process outcomes.  Finally, it argues that the courts can, and should, 
more effectively monitor and review the fairness of mandatory arbitration 
systems developed by one party by examining the impact of such systems on 
the settlement value of claims. 
II 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION WHEN BOTH PARTIES DESIGN THE SYSTEM 
There are numerous examples of arbitration systems mutually designed by 
the parties through arm’s length negotiation.  The parties may themselves 
determine on an ad hoc basis how the arbitration should proceed, or they may 
enter into individual submission agreements to arbitrate a given dispute under 
the auspices of a particular provider’s rules.15  The parties may voluntarily 
choose to follow a pre-existing system administered by the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA),16 JAMS,17 the CPR Institute for Dispute 
 
 13. The term “commercial arbitration” historically referred to all uses of arbitration outside the 
labor relations context—that is, in contrast to “labor arbitration.”  The term “employment arbitration” 
has evolved to refer to one substantive context in which parties use commercial arbitration—that is, 
for disputes arising out of the employment relationship.  For a more detailed discussion of this history, 
see JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISPUTES (1997).  For purposes of this Article, “commercial arbitration” is used to refer to all uses of 
arbitration except to resolve labor or employment disputes. 
 14. This argument has been made elsewhere in the context of mediation, see Lisa B. Bingham, 
Why Suppose? Let’s Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 101, and employment arbitration, see Bingham, supra note 3. 
 15. It is also possible for a single party to impose arbitration under a third-party provider’s ready-
made system.  This issue is addressed in Part III, infra. 
 16. To view the rules and standards that comprise the AAA’s commercial arbitration system 
designs, see Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Rules and Procedures, at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid= 
15747&JSPaid=37504 (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).  For an extensive empirical review of the construction 
industry’s use of mediation, commercial arbitration, and other forms of dispute resolution and a 
description of how this fits in the long-term relational model of contracting in that industry, see 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the United States 
Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65 (1996). 
 17. To view JAMS designs for commercial cases, see http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration_guide-
2003.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2004). 
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Resolution,18 or another third-party provider.  They may choose nonadminis-
tered arbitration by incorporating a provider’s rules into their contract.19 
The parties may feel comfortable using these systems because their 
organizations, their professional associations, or others representing them as 
stakeholders participated in the original design processes.20  They may adopt 
the design after the dispute arises or as part of a predispute, arm’s length 
contract because they mutually decide it is a superior way to manage conflicts.21 
Dispute resolution in the construction industry, for example, has evolved 
into its current form (a near monopoly for the AAA in standard contract 
clauses) as a function of long-term relationships among contractors, design 
professionals, and owners.22  Although it has standard clauses, the construction 
industry’s dispute system has evolved in response to industry members’ 
preferences, ascertained through periodic consultation and survey research.23  
The more recent design innovations in the industry—mediation and partnering, 
for example—reflect these members’ interest in a dispute-resolution system 
that assists them in maintaining ongoing relationships.24  The following three 
examples help to illustrate mutual party control over system design. 
 
 18. For information about the CPR Institute’s commercial arbitration system design, see 
http:// www.cpradr.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2004). 
 19. See CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS 
BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS 379 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. 
Kaskell eds., 2001). 
 20. E.g., Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a 
Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 930 (2002) (“There is a very 
special elite group of judges, retired judges, commercial courts, mediators, and arbitrators who provide 
tailor-made justice geared specifically to large business disputes—a category that includes the new 
wave of large class actions.  This elite has its own sets of lawyers as well, and this relatively small group 
dominates the agenda for federal court reform as well as the elite ADR market.”). 
 21. There is evidence that arbitral decisionmaking may be less subject to certain cognitive biases 
than jury decisionmaking.  See Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Winter/Spring 2004).  However, the empirical research on how 
dispute-system design affects arbitral judgments is limited.  See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham & Debra Mesch, 
Decision-Making in Employment and Labor Arbitration, 39 INDUS. REL. 671 (2000) (finding in an 
experimental study that the standard of decision and the makeup of the arbitrator panel made a 
difference in arbitral outcomes). 
 22. Stipanowich, supra note 16, at 69-76. 
 23. Id. at 79. 
 24. Id. at 81. International commercial arbitration is also generally viewed as the product of 
shared party control over dispute-system design.  See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie, Designing Non-national Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 193 (2001) (“In international arbitration, the most 
important constraints on decision makers are ex ante creational checks rather than ex post external or 
internal checks.  Consider first creational checking mechanisms, which arise from negotiations between 
the contracting parties superimposed upon a backdrop of arbitration-related national laws and treaties.  
Under the paramount arbitral principle of party autonomy, the parties have virtually unfettered 
discretion to choose the structure and rules under which their disputes will be decided.  Three of their 
ex ante choices, however, are the most significant for purposes of checking the power of arbitral panels: 
(1) deciding between ad hoc and institutional arbitration, (2) agreeing upon the place where the 
arbitration will be conducted, and (3) selecting the composition of the panel.”). 
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A. The CPR Institute 
The history of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution is instructive.  The 
Institute’s predecessor, the Center for Public Resources, was formed by in-
house counsel from Fortune 500 companies to adapt ADR rules to the unique 
context of their disputes with each other.25  The arbitration rules were 
developed through a participatory process involving representatives from 
corporate law departments.26  By signing the CPR Corporate Policy Statement, 
these companies all voluntarily agreed to consider using dispute resolution in 
appropriate cases, and implicitly endorsed the CPR Institute’s dispute-system 
design efforts.27 
The CPR Institute recently produced a handbook on commercial arbitra-
tion for business users.28  It is the collaborative product of a commission con-
sisting primarily of representatives of Institute members—lawyers from For-
tune 500 companies and the law firms that represent them.29  The authors 
observe that the most important advantage of binding arbitration for business 
users is control over the process—”the flexibility to make arbitration what you 
 
 25. The Institute’s website provides the following description: 
  Founded in 1979 as the Center for Public Resources, CPR’s mission is to spearhead 
innovation and promote excellence in public and private dispute resolution, and to serve as a 
primary multinational resource for avoidance, management and resolution of business-
related and other disputes.  To fulfill its mission, CPR is engaged in an integrated agenda of 
research and development, education, advocacy and dispute resolution.  It is the leading 
proponent of ADR that is managed by the parties and a highly qualified neutral, or self-
administered ADR. 
CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, About CPR, at http://www.cpradr.org/ (last modified Oct. 15, 2003) 
(emphasis added). 
 26. See CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, The CPR OnLine Form Book, at 
http://www.cpradr.org/formbook/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003) (“The CPR OnLine Form Book 
is a compilation of model procedures, clauses, forms, pledges, and commitments that have been 
developed by CPR and CPR members.”) (emphasis added). 
 27. See CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, ADR Pledges, at http://www.cpradr.org (last visited Oct. 
28, 2003).  The CPR Corporate Policy Statement provides: 
  We recognize that for many disputes there is a less expensive, more effective method of 
resolution than the traditional lawsuit.  Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures 
involve collaborative techniques [that] can often spare businesses the high costs of litigation. 
  In recognition of the foregoing, we subscribe to the following statements of principle on 
behalf of company and its domestic subsidiaries: 
  In the event of a business dispute between our company and another company which has 
made or will then make a similar statement, we are prepared to explore with that other party 
resolution of the dispute through negotiation or ADR techniques before pursuing full-scale 
litigation.  If either party believes that that dispute is not suitable for ADR techniques, or if 
such techniques do not produce results satisfactory to the disputants, either party may 
proceed with litigation. 
CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, CPR Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation 
(1984), available at http://www.cpradr.org/formbook/pdfs/4/pledges.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2003). 
 28. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 19. 
 29. See CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, CPR Membership Information, at 
http://www.cpradr.org/ (last modified Feb. 16, 2003). 
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want it to be.”30  Clearly, this presumes that business users have the power to 
define, through negotiation, the dispute-resolution system that culminates in 
arbitration. 31  This volume is not for the average consumer, upon whom 
arbitration is imposed without meaningful negotiation. 
B.  The Diamond Industry 
Professor Lisa Bernstein has studied private justice systems in the diamond 
and cotton industries.32  These are systems in which the contracting parties have 
opted out of both the traditional civil justice system and the use of third-party 
ADR providers.  Professor Bernstein describes the New York Diamond 
Dealers Club (DDC), a 2000-member private organization for site holders, 
manufacturers, wholesalers, and brokers in the U.S. diamond industry, with 
elected representatives on its board of directors.33  She observes that, as of 1992, 
“the sophisticated traders who dominate the industry [had] developed an 
elaborate, internal set of rules, complete with distinctive institutions and 
sanctions, to handle disputes among industry members.”34 
The DDC operated a private arbitration system that included mandatory, 
pre-arbitration conciliation; approximately eighty-five percent of the 150 
disputes submitted annually settled in conciliation.35  Professor Bernstein 
observes that the procedural rules for arbitration were “structured to give the 
parties control over the dispute resolution process and to create financial 
incentives to settle.”36  While members were obligated to use the system as a 
condition of membership in the DDC, the system was sufficiently well designed 
that nonmembers voluntarily used it to avoid the transaction and reputation 
costs of the courts.37 
The system began with a fact-finding by the DDC’s Floor Committee, which 
consisted of club members elected to two-year terms.  If the Committee 
determined there was a material issue of fact, the dispute went to arbitration 
before the Board of Arbitrators (again consisting of members elected to two-
year terms).  Proceedings and awards were confidential, and the arbitration fee 
 
 30. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 19, at xxv (observing that “business 
parties enjoy considerable flexibility and autonomy in fashioning their own arbitration agreements”) 
(emphasis added). 
 31. See, e.g., id. at xxvi-vii (stating that issues raised by labor, employment, and consumer arbitra-
tion are outside the scope of the book). 
 32. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law]; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]. 
 33. Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 32, at 119. 
 34. Id. at 115.  Beyond this observation, Bernstein does not report on the nature of discussions 
leading to the DDC’s arbitration system.  The DDC does not have a website or public means of verify-
ing the status of its current dispute resolution system.  Presumably, it has not changed. 
 35. Id. at 124. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 126. 
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was small.38  The arbitrators allocated the fees and expenses of arbitration, but 
they could also decide to refund the fee.  There was a right to appeal to a five-
arbitrator board of elected members who had not heard the original case.  The 
filing fee for an appeal was three times the amount of the initial fee, and 
members deposited funds or security to cover any judgment.  Parties also had 
the right to counsel.39 
The DCC could refuse to arbitrate claims outside the diamond business (its 
area of competence), claims involving nonmembers, and claims implicating 
“complicated statutory rights.”40  Moreover, the DCC would refuse to arbitrate 
on grounds of forum non conveniens if the claim was burdensome or 
inconvenient to handle in the Club.  If the DCC declined to arbitrate, the par-
ties could resort to other remedies.41  The representative structure of the DDC 
permitted those affected by its dispute-system design to affect its structure, 
with the resulting process appearing balanced and fair. 
C. The Cotton Industry 
In another example of mutually negotiated use of arbitration in a private 
justice system, the cotton industry has replaced the public legal system with a 
venerable system of private commercial law.  This system is governed by trade 
rules and arbitration provisions built into contracts for the purchase and sale of 
cotton between merchants or between merchants and mills.  Parallel to the 
DDC, professional associations within the industry operate through a 
democratic structure that provides for representation of the members’ interests. 
There are two main sources of arbitration services: the Board of Appeals 
created by the American Cotton Shippers Association (ACSA) and the 
American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) (primarily for disputes 
between merchants and mills), and the Memphis Cotton Exchange (MCE) 
arbitration tribunal (primarily for disputes between merchants).42  Both tribu-
nals are the result of a quasi-legislative process among the members of the 
respective professional associations.  Members of these associations agree, as a 
condition of their membership, to submit disputes to arbitration and to build 
arbitration into their contracts.  Membership can bring the advantage of better 
contract terms.43  Participation in this system is not mandatory, however; 
contracting parties need not be members of these associations and remain free 
to negotiate other terms. 
The impact of mutual control over dispute-system design is evident in the 
procedural rules for these arbitral bodies.  For example, the Board of Appeals 
consists of one arbitrator appointed by the president of each of the two 
 
 38. Id. at 125. 
 39. Id. at 126. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 127. 
 42. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 32, at 1726-27. 
 43. Id. at 1769-70. 
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collaborating professional associations, the ACSA and ATMI, based on the 
appointees’ industry experience and reputation for fairness and integrity.44  The 
Board conducts a paper review of the briefs and documentary evidence, but 
without knowing the parties’ identities, which are redacted from all documents.  
Professor Bernstein observes that this feature is intended to control arbitrator 
bias toward a particular individual, although the Board does know which party 
is merchant or mill.45  She notes that public circulation of the Board’s written 
opinions, which include the names of the arbitrators, discourages Board 
members from systematically favoring one industry segment over the other; 
disputants could observe any pattern and choose arbitration under other 
industry auspices.46 
The MCE panel has seven arbitrators, whom the MCE board of directors 
appoint annually.47  The panel holds oral hearings and permits cross-examina-
tion of witnesses, but does not publish its written opinions.  There is a norm of 
consensus decisionmaking; from 1944 to 1991, only four of ninety-two decisions 
were not unanimous.  Professor Bernstein observes that the seven-member 
constitution of the panel may also constrain arbitrator bias.48  Both arbitration 
bodies permit limited discovery and representation by counsel. 
One of the reasons the cotton industry system works is that the parties have 
also negotiated detailed, standard, bright-line rules for inclusion in their 
contracts.49  Professor Bernstein states that this private legal system works 
“extraordinarily well”; it resolves disputes “expeditiously and inexpensively,” 
and it keeps transaction costs, error costs, legal system costs, and collection 
costs low.50  It also yields a body of written decisions that reflect coherent 
jurisprudence and that are both respected and promptly, voluntarily 
implemented. 
 
* * *  
These examples illustrate the impact that shared control over dispute-
system design can have on system process and function.  Industry members 
have control over dispute-system design through the representative democratic 
organization of the professional associations adopting the system.  In the cotton 
and diamond industries, the resulting systems have a natural, organic mutuality 
and balance; they are self-regulating.  They evenhandedly represent the 
interests of both disputants because both participated in the system design, 
either directly or through their representative industry group. 
 
 44. Id. at 1728. 
 45. Id. at 1744 & n.90. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1728. 
 48. Id. at 1744 n.90. 
 49. Id. at 1731-39. 
 50. Id. at 1725. 
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Designing a system for resolving conflict can be a quasi-legislative process, 
much like rulemaking.  It is accepted wisdom in negotiated rulemaking and 
consensus processes that interested parties or their representatives should be at 
the table; unrepresented parties’ interests may not be reflected in the product 
of the negotiated rulemaking process, and their absence may undermine its 
credibility.51  Similarly, a commercial arbitration system is more representative 
of parties’ interests if these parties have some control over its design. 
III 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION WHEN ONE PARTY DESIGNS THE SYSTEM 
Most of the commentary on mandatory arbitration focuses on circum-
stances in which one party has complete control over dispute-system design and 
exercises it to impose binding arbitration on the other party—that is, Cell E of 
Table 1.52  These uses of mandatory arbitration cover, among others, disputes 
between debtors and creditors, patients and health care providers, and 
consumers and service providers.  The criticisms of these uses of arbitration 
essentially boil down to discomfort with one party’s control over dispute-
system design and with the ways this manifests itself in the resulting arbitration 
process.  This Part examines how institutional players can use control over 
dispute-system design to alter the settlement value of claims brought against 
them.  It then turns to the efforts of third-party dispute-resolution service 
 
 51. See Susan Carpenter, Choosing Appropriate Consensus Building Techniques and Strategies, in 
THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 90-93; David Laws, Representation of 
Stakeholding Interests, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 263-69; Lawrence 
Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a Conflict Assessment, in THE CONSENSUS 
BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 108-10; Lawrence Susskind, A Short Guide to Consensus-
Building, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 38. 
 52. See, e.g., Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or 
Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 331 (1996); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral 
Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945 (1996); Harry T. Edwards, 
Where are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 293 (1999); Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using 
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399 (2000); Michael Z. Green, 
Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a 
Trap for the Unwary Consumer?, 5 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 112 (1993); Colin P. Johnson, Has 
Arbitration Become a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?: A Comment Exploring the Incompatibility Between 
Pre-Dispute Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements in Employment Contracts and Statutorily 
Created Rights, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 511 (2000); John P. Roberts, Mandatory Arbitration by Financial 
Institutions, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 365 (1996); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of 
Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1069 (1998); Christine Stegehuis, Mandatory Arbitration and the Medical Malpractice Plaintiff, 27-May 
COLO. LAW. 77 (1998); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, 
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000); Beth E. Sullivan, The High Cost of 
Efficiency: Mandatory Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 311 (1999).  For a 
review of the case law treating consent to arbitration clauses, see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, 
Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 167 (Winter/Spring 2004).  For a cogent criticism of current Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
arbitration, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
331; see also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Right Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33. 
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providers to exercise some constraint on institutions with the economic power 
to impose mandatory arbitration. 
A. One-Party Control and the Settlement Range 
Large corporations and other institutional players pay legal professionals 
and consultants good money to help them manage conflict, liability, and risk.53  
Typically, the closest an individual comes to risk management is buying 
insurance, making a will, and getting regular health care.  It is unsurprising, 
then, that institutional players attempt to structure their relationships with 
individuals to minimize exposure to loss. Some research suggests that these 
players overreact to perceived risk,54 especially the risk of litigation and large 
damage awards.55  Repeat players operate within a legal framework that affords 
opportunities to structure relationships and to set limits on liability; for 
example, they can impose disclaimers, adopt liquidated damages clauses, and 
revise adhesive contracts for the next similar transaction based on experience.56  
The resulting structure may affect the scope of their risk from a particular kind 
of claim or dispute.57 
In his classic article on the quality of settlement, Professor Marc Galanter 
argues that all dispute resolution occurs in the shadow of the civil justice 
system.58  In a series of simple examples showing the reservation price59 and 
 
 53. See, e.g., COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 5, at 69-94 (discussing consulting 
relationships in dispute-system design); Garth, supra note 20, at 930 (arguing that an elite group of 
professionals representing the interests of large businesses helps to negotiate rules that favor their 
clients by structuring ADR to hold down conflict and expense). 
 54. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of the Legal Environment: The 
Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47 (1992). 
 55. See  JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR MARKET RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER 
LIABILITY (1992); JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION (1988); Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering to 
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (Winter/Spring 2004) (providing empirical evidence of the prevalence of 
mandatory arbitration and suggesting that there is little strategic reason for a business to prefer a less 
costly or more expeditious forum, and that the more likely motivation is risk management). 
 56. The strategic advantages that repeat players enjoy in the civil justice system compared to one-
shotters such as consumers have been outlined with clarity and eloquence by Marc Galanter.  See Marc 
Galanter,  Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & 
SOC’Y  REV. 95 (1974).  For discussions applying Galanter’s framework to dispute resolution, see, for 
example, Alderman, supra note 1, at 1253-58; Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive 
Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 
1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out 
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19 
(1999). 
 57. For a thoughtful discussion of how institutional players are using arbitration to manage their 
risk from personal injury claims, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (Winter/Spring 
2004). 
 58. Marc Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 55. 
 59. The reservation price is the lowest or least advantageous agreement a party will actually 
accept; anything worse and that party will implement her best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
and walk away from the negotiation.  It is also sometimes called the “bottom line.”  DAVID A. LAX & 
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transaction costs for each of two litigating parties, he demonstrates that the 
settlement range60 is often produced by a combination of differences in parties’ 
estimates of the outcome in court and the known costs of pursuing litigation.61  
Sometimes, the settlement range is entirely a function of transaction costs.62  In 
the civil justice system, lawyers estimate outcomes based on substantive legal 
knowledge and an understanding of how the relevant court system functions in 
a particular jurisdiction, including the reasonably foreseeable costs of 
litigation.63 
Control over dispute-system design allows a disputant to change the for-
mula.  With mandatory arbitration designed by one party, the other party finds 
herself bargaining in the shadow of something different from the civil justice 
system.  This can alter the settlement range of cases to such an extent that, in 
some circumstances, it may no longer be cost-effective for the non-controlling 
party to make a claim at all. 
Most claims or disputes have a range of values within which the parties can 
reach a negotiated settlement.  This “bargaining set,” or “settlement range,” is 
defined by each party’s reservation price—defined as the walk-away value, or 
the maximum the party is willing to pay or accept. Anything worse will cause 
the party to break off negotiation.  The reservation price is in turn partly 
defined by each party’s alternatives to negotiation.  All settlement occurs in the 
shadow of the alternative, referred to as the “best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement,” or the “BATNA.”64  Often, this alternative is litigation.65  
Mandatory arbitration changes the BATNA from litigation to arbitration.  
Negotiation scholars observe that changing the alternatives to a negotiated 
 
JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND 
COMPETITIVE GAIN 51 (1986). 
 60. The settlement range is also sometimes referred to as the bargaining set.  It is defined as the 
difference between the parties’ reservation prices.  Id. at 119-21.  If, for example, the seller has a 
reservation price of $10 (the least she will accept) and the buyer has a reservation price of $12 (the 
most he will pay), there is a settlement range of between $10 and $12.  If the seller instead has a 
reservation price of $12 and the buyer $10, there is no settlement range at all. 
 61. Galanter, supra note 58, at 69-71. 
 62. If A expects to recover $100 and B to pay $100 in damages, both expect to pay $20 in transac-
tion costs such as attorneys’ fees, and A expects to lose $5 while B gains $5 in interest on the use of the 
money during the delay, these transaction costs produce a settlement range of between $75 as the 
lowest A will accept, and $115, as the most B will pay.  If A and B have different estimates of what will 
happen in court, the transaction costs make the difference.  If A thinks she will recover $110, but B 
expects to pay only $90, and there are no transaction costs, there is no settlement range.  If you factor 
in the $20 in attorneys’ fees or costs and $5 for the time-value of money, you now have a settlement 
range between $85, as the least A will accept, and $105, as the most B will pay.  Id. 
 63. For a detailed discussion of the settlement range, see LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 59, at 46-
62. 
 64. This alternative is what each party can do unilaterally, without the agreement of the other, to 
meet its own needs or interests.  See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97-106 (2d ed. 1991); see also LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 59. 
 65. Most cases result in “litigaotiation,” or settlement in the shadow of litigation, with full 
adjudication occurring with relative infrequency.  For a review of the decline in contract litigation and 
a survey of available empirical findings on its extent and causes, including referral to ADR, see Marc 
Galanter, Contract in Court; Or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know About 
Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 596. 
BINGHAM_GLOBAL.FMT.DOC 10/14/2004  10:14 AM 
234 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:221 
agreement can have a powerful effect on the bargaining set.66  In fact, one 
effective negotiation strategy is to worsen the other side’s alternatives and 
improve one’s own.67 
The courts have opened the doors to institutional experimentation in 
designing dispute systems to minimize the settlement value of claims through 
their support for the general enforceability of adhesive arbitration clauses in 
standard-form contracts under the Federal Arbitration Act.68  Through these 
clauses, one party can select all the dispute-system design elements that are 
legally permissible, or at least have not yet been held unconscionable or oth-
erwise unenforceable.  These adhesive clauses can stipulate: time limits for 
filing; whether there will be nonadministered arbitration or a third-party 
administrator; whether a panel or a single arbitrator will be used; the method of 
selection of the arbitrator(s); the location of the arbitration hearing; the 
apportionment of filing fees, arbitrator fees, and disputants’ attorneys’ fees; the 
extent of discovery available; the substantive standard to be applied; the scope 
of the arbitration; the extent of confidentiality of the process; the extent of 
confidentiality of the award or outcome; the remedies available; the availability 
of class action relief; the availability of written, reasoned decisions; the 
standard of review for errors of law; and whether new legal precedent can be 
established, to name just a few.69 
The examples described below illustrate how one party with exclusive 
control over dispute-system design can use mandatory arbitration to alter the 
settlement range for certain kinds of claims through establishing and allocating 
arbitration fees and costs, through precluding class actions, through specifying 
the location of the arbitration, and through allocating responsibility for 
attorneys’ fees.  In general, through a variety of different design elements, 
institutions can both impose new costs on the claimant and reduce likely 
recovery.  This shifts the settlement range to favor the institution by lowering 
the payment necessary to satisfy the claim, sometimes down to zero. 
1. The Fees and Costs of Arbitration 
Transaction costs in arbitration have several components.  There are filing 
fees to initiate a claim, forum fees to pay for hearing space and case 
administration, and fees to pay the arbitrator or arbitrators.  These are all 
separate from the transaction costs for obtaining legal counsel or witnesses that 
are present in both private and public justice systems.  One recent study 
examined how these costs compare to court costs by researching filing fees, 
 
 66. See, e.g., LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 59, at 55-60. 
 67. Id. at 55. 
 68. See, e.g., Sajida A. Mahdi, Gateway to Arbitration: Issues of Contract Formation Under the 
U.C.C. and the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses Included in Standard Form Contracts Shipped 
With Goods, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 403 (2001) (reviewing the state of the law with respect to standard-
form contracts shipped with computers after telephone or internet orders).  A critique of the current 
case law is outside the scope of this Article. 
 69. Id. at 430-35. 
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administrative case-management fees, hearing or arbitrator fees, room fees, 
subpoena fees, discovery-request fees, motion fees, continuance fees, post-
hearing memo fees, and written findings charges at the AAA, the National 
Arbitration Forum (NAF), JAMS, and the Cook County, Illinois, Circuit 
Court.70  For a $2,500 claim, it found that total forum costs in court consisted 
only of the $81 filing fee. The AAA total was $125, the NAF’s $120, and 
JAMS’s a minimum of $700 (a $250 case-management fee and minimum $450 
per diem for the arbitrator).71  For a $20,000 claim, the court costs consisted of a 
$221 filing fee.  The AAA total was $375, the NAF total $4,625, and the JAMS 
total a minimum of $3,750.72  The third-party providers have disputed some of 
these figures, which do not appear to take into account an arbitrator’s 
discretion to allocate filing fees as part of a remedy.  One provider has recently 
changed its policy on costs for employment arbitration to reduce the cost to 
claimants.73  Moreover, it is of course possible for a party with control over 
design to provide a plan that provides for reimbursement.74 
However, these organizations and arbitrators are not bound to shift the 
costs to the institutional disputant.  Let us assume for the sake of argument that 
a hypothetical third-party arbitration provider, Arbitration Unlimited, did in 
fact charge what JAMS was reported to charge.75 These comparisons suggest 
that through mandating arbitration with Arbitration Unlimited in lieu of court, 
a party could design a dispute system to shift the settlement value of a $2,500 
claim by at least $619 in that party’s favor.  A similar design choice would shift 
the settlement value of a $20,000 claim by at least $3,529. 
Moreover, this effect is in addition to the fact that financial hardship might 
preclude the filing of a claim altogether.  Some litigants have argued that the 
initial filing fee is so high in relation to their income that it precludes them from 
pursuing a claim at all.76  Others have argued that the amount of the fee is 
substantively unconscionable77 because it is excessive in relation to the value of 
 
 70. See  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION (2002). 
 71. Id. at 42. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISPUTES (revised Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc= 
upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\National_International\..\..\focusArea\employment\AAA121cur
rent.html. 
 74. Some systems provide for reimbursement of filing fees, or for the arbitrator to award them as 
part of costs to a prevailing claimant.  See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 55, at 70-71.  And 
arbitrators have broad discretion to tailor a remedy.  See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, 
supra note 28, at 269-81. 
 75. Apart from rules prohibiting price-fixing among them, there is no state or federal regulation of 
how dispute-resolution service providers set their fees and charges. 
 76. See Melissa Briggs Hutchens, At What Costs?: When Consumers Cannot Afford the Costs of 
Arbitration in Alabama, 53 ALA. L. REV. 599, 606 n.68 (2002) (describing Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto 
Sales, Inc., 718 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1998), in which a minister who earned $19,000 per year claimed he 
could not afford to pay the $1,500 minimum required to initiate arbitration). 
 77. See Mahdi, supra note 68, at 430 (discussing substantive and procedural unconscionability in 
consumer contracts, and describing contracts of adhesion involving a gross imbalance in bargaining 
power and a lack of knowledge of the contract terms as examples of procedural unconscionability). 
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the claim, as was the case in Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,78 in which the 
nonrefundable portion of the filing fee ($2,000) exceeded the value of the 
average computer.79  In addition many consumers who would be eligible for the 
even less expensive forum of small claims court, may instead be forced to 
arbitrate.80  The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of allegedly 
prohibitive arbitration costs.81  It imposed on the claimant the burden of 
proving that costs are actually excessive, not simply estimated to be so.82  
Commentators have begun to call for a different approach, specifically, a court-
created rule that would shift the fees and costs of arbitration away from the 
consumer and back to the business or entity designing the mandatory 
arbitration program.83 
2. Class Action Preclusion 
The class action provides a means for many claimants with small amounts of 
money at stake to pursue precedent-setting litigation by aggregating their 
claims.  Adhesive arbitration, however, may be used to preclude class actions.84  
For example, major credit card companies are using arbitration clauses that 
expressly disallow consumers from joining or consolidating with other card 
members or acting as a representative or member of a class or in the capacity of 
a private attorney general.85  Professor Alderman has noted that a business 
using mandatory arbitration can prevent class action litigants from establishing 
precedent or effectively using discovery.86 
 
 78. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) (holding an arbitration clause in a standard-form sales 
contract substantively unconscionable when it designated the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris, France, as third-party administrator, and when that forum had a $4,000 filing fee, $2,000 of 
which was nonrefundable, even if the claimant prevailed). 
 79. In contrast to these instances reflecting one party’s decision to impose a relatively high filing 
fee on the other party, in the diamond industry, the fee is low, and it is within the arbitrators’ 
discretion to refund the fee.  Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 32, at 125. 
 80. Alderman, supra note 1, at 1252. 
 81. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding that an arbitration 
agreement’s silence on costs and fees is insufficient to render it unenforceable as precluding the 
litigant from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights).  For a detailed analysis of Randolph 
and its impact on consumers, see Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (Winter/Spring 2004); see also Alderman, supra note 1, at 1252 
(stating that excessive costs may be sufficient to invalidate a predispute mandatory arbitration 
agreement if they effectively preclude the claimant from vindicating her federal statutory rights). 
 82. See 531 U.S. at 92. 
 83. See, e.g.,  Julia A. Scarpino, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer Disputes: A 
Proposal to Ease the Financial Burden on Low-Income Consumers, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 679 (2002) (arguing in favor of fee- and cost-shifting analogous to the rule for employment 
arbitration created in Cole v. Burns International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
 84. Alderman, supra note 1, at 1254, 1258-62; Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitration of Consumer 
Claims: The Sad Case of Two-Time Victim Terry Johnson; Or, Where Have You Gone Learned Hand, 
10 B.U. PUB. INT’L L.J. 366, 366-67 (2001); Sternlight, supra note 52. 
 85. Johanna Harrington, To Litigate or Arbitrate? No Matter—The Credit Card Industry is 
Deciding for You, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 102 (citing the Discover Platinum Cardmember 
Agreement). 
 86. See Alderman, supra note 1, at 1256. 
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The law regarding class action preclusion is still under development.87  But 
during this period of uncertainty, one party can use class action preclusion to 
ensure that the other has high individual transaction costs.  Rather than 
claimants being able to combine to pursue a common claim with common 
counsel, each must seek separate counsel, pay separate filing fees, and lose all 
of the benefits of economies of scale.  Again, this dispute-system design choice 
can alter the settlement range of an underlying claim and make pursuit of a 
small consumer claim economically irrational.88 
3. Location of Forum 
An arbitration hearing must be held somewhere, at least until video tele-
conferencing and webcasting become more prevalent media for conducting 
dispute resolution.89  Many arbitration clauses designate a particular city as the 
site of hearings.90  Professor Drahozal’s study of franchise agreements found 
that franchisors typically designate a location close to their home.91  Analysis of 
the predatory mortgage-lending industry finds that predatory loans frequently 
contain mandatory arbitration clauses that force the borrower to arbitrate in a 
forum favorable to the lender, often a far-off location for the borrower.92  In 
contrast, the standard AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules permit a party to 
object to the other’s request for a specific locale, and thus give the ultimate 
decision on location to the AAA.93 
The ability to designate place is the ability to impose the costs of travel and 
lodging on the other party.  It may also be the ability to impose on the other 
party the cost of retaining local representation.  These costs may be minimal, or 
 
 87. In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002), the Court held that an arbitration clause 
did not bar the EEOC from pursuing vindication of statutory employment rights in the form of a class 
action.  The Court has not yet addressed the issue in the context of consumer claims.  For a detailed 
analysis of how this issue may fare in the Supreme Court, see Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, 
Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable 
Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (Winter/Spring 2004). 
 88. Id. at 85-88. 
 89. For a review of current forms of on-line dispute resolution, see Lucille M. Ponte, Throwing 
Bad Money After Bad: Can Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Really Deliver the Goods for the 
Unhappy Internet Shopper?, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 55 (2001) (reflecting on the limited use 
of ODR at present and why this is the case). 
 90. In Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998), for example, the arbitra-
tion clause specified that hearings would take place in Chicago, Illinois.  Id. at 570. 
 91. See Drahozal, supra note 1, at 733 (arguing that these are not dissimilar from standard forum-
selection clauses and that there may be compensating economic benefits for consumers and others). 
 92. Anne-Marie Motto, Comment, Skirting the Law: How Predatory Mortgage Lenders are 
Destroying the American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 866 (2002) (observing that this is a 
particular hardship on the elderly, but citing cases in which several courts have rejected motions to 
compel arbitration when lenders rushed elderly borrowers through the signing of a stack of 
documents).  These clauses provide interesting contrasts with the express exclusion from arbitration of 
cases involving inconvenient forums in the diamond industry.  See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 
32, at 126. 
 93. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES, R-1 (amended July 1, 2003), available at http:www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747 
&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\National_International\..\..\focusArea\commercial\AA
A235current.htm#R10. 
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they may be significant, depending on the facts of the particular dispute and on 
whether one nationwide location is specified or multiple locations are available 
to serve different regions.  In most cases, presumably, these costs will exceed 
what someone would incur to travel to the nearest small claims court. 
Of course, parties have long engaged in forum shopping, a related but dis-
tinct activity that allows one party to impose travel costs on the other to some 
degree.94  However, the substantial distinction is that in mandatory arbitration, 
one party is designing the forum, not simply picking one that a governmental-
third party has designed.  Once one party selects a judicial forum, a third party 
controls the remaining aspects of dispute-system design; moreover, that third 
party is operating in a constitutional framework with public accountability. 
The problem with one-party control over dispute-system design is that the 
various costs that may be shifted to the non-controlling party are not simply 
cumulative.  The decision to pursue a claim is a binary decision: yes or no.  The 
various transaction costs will combine in such a way that, at a given point, the 
claimant will abandon the claim. 
In mandatory arbitration, an increase in transaction costs related to des-
ignation of forum locale interacts with other shifts in transaction costs.  This 
directly affects the settlement range or bargaining set, predictably lowering the 
settlement value of claims.  And these costs can ultimately combine to force the 
party bearing them over the threshold between pursuing and not pursuing a 
claim, as when the costs of arbitration exceed the value of a claim or a 
claimant’s personal resources. 
4. Apportionment of Attorneys’ Fees 
The American Rule on attorneys’ fees provides that each party pays the 
cost of its own legal counsel in the absence of a statute specifically authorizing 
fee shifting.95  Through contract, however, parties can shift the burden of 
attorneys’ fees to the losing party.  Attorneys’ fees are widely variable and hard 
to estimate at the outset of a claim.  The claimant has no control over whether 
the other party pays the claimant’s counsel on a flat fee or hourly basis, for 
example, or, under either method, the actual rate of pay. 
The uncertainty associated with attorneys’ fees makes it hard to estimate 
their impact on the settlement range.  It is possible that the potential recovery 
of attorneys’ fees for the prevailing claimant may make it easier to institute a 
claim in a case of clear liability;96 by altering the settlement range in the 
claimant’s favor, this may also encourage the institution to settle before 
arbitration.  But the uncertainty over attorney’s fees makes free-shifting 
 
 94. Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 290 (1999); 
Note, Forum Shopping Revisited, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677 (1990).  Forum shopping describes one or 
more party’s efforts to take advantage of one particular dispute-system design created by a third 
party—for example, the civil justice system as it functions in a particular jurisdiction, including its body 
of precedent. 
 95. See Drahozal, supra note 1, at 759-60. 
 96. Id. 
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arbitration clauses a powerful deterrent to bringing a claim when there is any 
ambiguity regarding liability.  Particularly in cases involving new theories of 
liability, the risk of having to pay the other party’s attorneys’ fees may dissuade 
a prospective claimant from pursuing a claim.  Thus, the ability of a party 
controlling dispute-system design to control the allocation of attorneys’ fees 
could have the effect of causing some greater percentage of claimants to 
abandon their claims than would in the absence of that element. 
 
* * *  
The Supreme Court has held that arbitration is merely a change in forum; it 
does not affect substantive rights.97  The question, however, is this: Does a 
change in forum that directly affects the settlement range of a claim represent a 
change in substance?  One can argue that the settlement value of a claim is 
always fluid and subjective because it is subject to influences apart from the 
merits of the claim, such as the charisma of a particular litigant or witness, the 
political context in which litigation occurs, or the timing of the case in relation 
to other similar litigation that may have set a pattern for jury awards.  On the 
other hand, most litigation is about money, a pool of potential recovery that 
transforms a person’s subjective sense of aggrievement98 into the res, that thing 
in which legal counsel may acquire an interest.  Even if we cannot know in 
absolute terms the cash value of hypothetical case X, we can identify whether 
and how a one-party dispute-system design shifts the settlement value of case 
X.  If that change is substantial, indeed substantial enough to make pursuing a 
claim at all impossible, is this not a change in the substantive rights of the 
parties? 
The ultimate question is one of public policy.  If we assume that the civil 
justice system reflects state and national policies on what is fair and appropriate 
access to justice, we may wish to find ways to curb one-party control over 
dispute-system design in private justice systems.  Conversely, we may believe 
that permitting one party to exercise this control is either fair and appropriate 
or economically efficient.99 
B. Third-Party Providers and One-Party Control 
In some of the most egregious cases of slanted, one-party arbitration 
designs, courts have noted the absence of an independent, third-party dispute-
 
 97. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (“In these cases we 
recognized that ‘by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, 
forum.’”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
 98. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980-81). 
 99. See Drahozal, supra note 1, at 764-65. 
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resolution service provider to administer the program.100  Third-party ADR 
administrators, in particular the AAA, have made efforts to develop protocols 
to regulate the arbitration process in employment and consumer cases.101  In 
fact, third-party providers may refuse to endorse whole categories of 
arbitration.  The AAA, for example, no longer administers arbitrations 
between individuals and health care providers unless there is a post-dispute 
arbitration agreement; in other words, it will not administer mandatory 
arbitration through predispute clauses.102  The AAA’s Employment Protocol 
and Consumer Protocol103 represent attempts by a third-party provider to 
temper the true effect of one-party control in the design of arbitration systems, 
guaranteeing claimants the right to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, 
the right to counsel, the right to reasonable discovery, the right to a written 
award, and other procedural safeguards generally described by the term “due 
process.”  In both cases, the AAA convened a working group or advisory 
committee intended to represent the interests of all the parties to arbitration104 
 
 100. For a concise discussion, see Stephen J. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the Arbitration-
Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 129, 139-45 
(2002) (discussing the systems designed by Hooters and Kaiser Permanente). 
 101. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND 
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995) 
[hereinafter AAA, EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL], available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid= 
15769&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\Protocols\..\..\focusArea\employment\protocol.ht
ml; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF 
THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1998) [hereinafter AAA, CONSUMER 
PROTOCOL], available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15769&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE 
\Rules_Procedures\Protocols\..\..\Resources\EduResources\consumer_protocol.html.  Professor John 
Lande has suggested that third-party efforts to regulate one-party control may warrant separate treat-
ment in analysis of control in dispute-system design. 
 102.  The AAA announced the changes as follows: 
  As a result of a review of its caseload in the health care area, the American Arbitration 
Association has announced that it will no longer accept the administration of cases involving 
individual patients without a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate.  In order to provide suffi-
cient notice to provide for an orderly transition, this change will become effective on January 
1, 2003. 
  AAA, the world’s largest provider of alternative dispute resolution services, has also 
determined that there will be no change in the administration of cases in the health care area 
where businesses, providers, health care companies, or other entities are involved on both 
sides of the dispute. 
  Distinguishing a patient undergoing health care treatment from other situations involving 
an individual, AAA has determined that they will continue to administer pre-dispute agree-
ments to arbitrate in all areas outside of the health care field, as long as there are appropriate 
due process safeguards as defined by the courts. 
Press Release, Am. Arbitration Ass’n, AAA  Announces Change in Health Care Policy: Cases 
Involving Patients Must Have Post-Dispute Agreement to Arbitrate (June 13, 2002), available at 
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235&JSPsrc=upload/livesite/focusArea/Healthcare/HEAL
TH%20CARE%20POLICY%20STATEMENT.htm. 
 103. See AAA, EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL, supra note 101; AAA, CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra 
note 101. 
 104. Members of the drafting committee for the Consumer Protocol included representatives of 
Consumers Union, Consumer Action, the American Council on Consumer Interests, Freddie Mac, 
Fannie Mae, the AAA, the Virginia and New York state consumer fraud departments, the AARP, and 
the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection, as well as faculty from various law 
schools.  See AAA, CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 101.  The participants signed in their personal 
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with the goal of developing the essential criteria for a fundamentally fair 
arbitration system.105  In its statement of ethics as a provider organization, the 
AAA refuses to administer cases if the arbitration clause substantially and 
materially deviates from the Consumer Protocol.106 
One might argue that when a third-party provider enforces an otherwise 
voluntary protocol, it changes a one-party design into a third-party design.107  
The problem with this argument is that it is up to the party controlling dispute-
system design to choose whether it will designate the third-party provider as its 
dispute-system administrator.  Control over dispute-system design still rests in 
the hands of the company or organization making this choice.108  One 
commentator has observed that this choice is not simply forum shopping 
because the incomes of the provider and its neutrals are affected by one party’s 
view of the extent to which that provider’s services tilt in its direction.109 
This section illustrates how the AAA’s Consumer Protocol compensates for 
one-party control and evaluates the effectiveness of this arrangement as a 
 
capacities, but they all represented the interests of those served by their organizations.  Professor 
Thomas Metzloff has suggested that it may be possible for those acting in a fiduciary capacity to design 
a balanced or fundamentally fair system for others.  It is interesting that the Protocols were negotiated, 
not by those acting in a fiduciary relationship, but rather by representatives of political institutions and 
special-interest lobbying groups.  In at least one case in which a fiduciary relationship arguably existed, 
the resulting ADR system design failed to pass muster for fundamental fairness.  See Engalla v. Perma-
nente Med. Group, Inc, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement in a 
medical malpractice claim due to the HMO’s unreasonable delay in selecting an arbitrator after 
fraudulent representations were made in the arbitration plan).  Significantly, the AAA has also refused 
to administer arbitration between individual patients and health care providers.  See supra note 102. 
 105. See AAA, CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 101, Principle 1 (“All parties are entitled to a 
fundamentally-fair ADR process.  As embodiments of fundamental fairness, these Principles should be 
observed in structuring ADR Programs.”). 
 106. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, STATEMENT OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235&JSPsrc=upload/ 
livesite/Rules_Procedures/Ethics_Standards/principals.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) (“For consumer 
cases with claims under $75,000, the AAA reviews the contract clause to determine if it substantially 
and materially deviates from the Consumer Due Process Protocol. The AAA reserves the right to 
refuse to administer arbitrations with consumer clauses that violate the Consumer Due Process 
Protocol.”). 
 107. Professor India Johnson, Remarks at the Roscoe Pound Institute’s Second Annual Lawyers’ 
Conference, The Coming Crisis in Mandatory Arbitration (Oct. 4, 2002). 
 108. An analogous situation exists in certain third-party designs approving a limited set of third-
party ADR administrators if the third party gives one of the disputants the power to designate which 
provider it will use.  Professor Michael Froomkin has observed that in the context of ICANN’s process, 
complainants can unilaterally designate a provider, which leads providers to market their services to 
the complainants with friendly rules like those of the National Arbitration Forum (NAF).  See A. 
Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy’—Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 605, 676 (2002).  See generally infra Part IV.B.  NAF allows parties to file an extra 
brief five days after the ordinary close of pleadings for $150; since the ordinary close of pleadings is 
marked by the registrant’s response, and there is only one such five-day period, the result is to allow 
complainants to sandbag registrants with supplemental pleadings of unlimited length.  Id.  Some have 
described the NAF as biased toward complainants.  Id. 
   109. See id.  Interestingly, Professor Froomkin suggests that the best solution is to require parties to 
mutually agree upon a provider, converting a one-party choice into a two-party choice.  Id. at 691. 
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means of minimizing the impact of one-party systems on the settlement value 
of the claim.110 
The Consumer Protocol takes the position that predispute arbitration 
agreements ought not to preclude consumers from seeking relief in small claims 
court “for disputes or claims within the scope of [such a court’s] jurisdiction.”111  
The reporter’s comments indicate that the committee determined that small 
claims court is often the least expensive, most expeditious, most convenient, 
and most appropriate forum for resolving consumer claims.112  In other words, 
the Protocol takes a position against mandatory arbitration for claims within 
small claims court jurisdiction.  This, in turn, essentially neutralizes any impact 
that arbitration might have on the settlement value of a small claim.  If the 
consumer can still resort to small claims court at his discretion, then settlement 
will occur in the shadow of the civil justice system, not of arbitration. 
For claims outside the jurisdiction of small claims courts, the Protocol 
identifies key principles for structuring the arbitration process.  It provides that 
the cost of a consumer ADR program should be reasonable, considering the 
circumstances of the dispute, the size and nature of the claim, the nature of the 
goods and services provided, and the consumer’s ability to pay.113  The 
committee’s rationale for this rule was comparative; the civil justice system is 
publicly subsidized and therefore low in cost, so a private system displacing the 
public system should be reasonably priced as well.114  In addition, court-annexed 
ADR programs are low in cost and usually free to the consumer.115  The 
committee did not explicitly require the institutional party to pay all costs of 
arbitration or to subsidize the consumer’s legal fees; rather, it left the principle 
general in application, and the reporter’s comments observe that it may be 
possible to provide arbitration at reasonable cost through the use of telephone, 
internet, electronic, or written submissions.116  Although the Protocol does not 
expressly define the term “reasonable,” one possible interpretation is that an 
arbitration program must have minimal impact on the settlement value of the 
claim. 
The Protocol and the reasonable-cost standard do not have the force of law.  
Whether the Protocol is at all effective depends on whether the parties with 
 
 110. This discussion will focus on the Consumer Due Process Protocol because I have recently 
reported elsewhere on an empirical analysis of the effects of the Employment Protocol.  See Bingham, 
supra note 3, at 895-96  (finding that employer success rates declined in mandatory arbitration after 
enforcement of the Employment Protocol, and arguing that the Protocol made a difference by 
compensating for employer control over dispute-system design).  Principles 2, 3, and 4 of the 
Consumer Protocol emphasize the need for joint selection of competent, qualified, impartial neutrals. 
These have no obvious, measurable impact on the settlement range, so they are also omitted from this 
discussion. 
 111. AAA, CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 101, Principle 5. 
 112. Id. at 5.  Professor Thomas Stipanowich, a highly regarded arbitration scholar who now serves 
as President of the CPR Institute, was the reporter for the committee. 
 113. Id. Principle 6. 
 114. Id. Principle 6, Reporter’s Comments. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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design control decide to implement it, though it is true that a party with design 
control might choose to implement an even more balanced system. 
Protocols can make a difference in the outcomes of an arbitration system.117  
The significant policy question is how many institutions with design control are 
making the choice to follow them, and how many are evading the protections 
afforded by third-party protocols through the simple expedient of setting up 
their own panels of neutrals or contracting with small, local providers.  What is 
apparent is that justice systems designed by one party will often look very 
different from those designed mutually by the parties or those designed by 
third parties. 
IV 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION WHEN A THIRD PARTY DESIGNS THE SYSTEM 
Under some circumstances, a third party such as a legislature, court, or 
administrative agency designs a dispute-resolution system for the parties.118  The 
resulting system may be a form of mandatory arbitration, but it may not suffer 
any of the deficiencies frequently cited by the critics of mandatory arbitration.  
The distinction between mandatory arbitration designed by one party and that 
designed by a third party is this: Systems designed by one of the disputants are 
often perceived as favoring that disputant.  Two examples, one drawn from 
amateur sports119 and the other from recent developments in on-line 
arbitration,120 illustrate this point. 
A. Amateur Sports 
The complex world of amateur sports uses arbitration at the national and 
international levels to resolve conflicts regarding drug use, eligibility to com-
pete, and the interpretation and application of other rules adopted by national 
sports organizations (NSOs), international sports federations (IFs), national 
Olympic committees (NOCs), and the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC).  Because there is no single sovereign authority that can dictate a 
comprehensive dispute-system design, a variety of approaches have been 
developed.  For example, an NSO may develop its own dispute-resolution 
 
 117. See Bingham, supra note 3, at 895-96. 
 118. For more discussion and examples, see Bingham, supra note 3, at 902-07.  One example is the 
use of arbitration under no-fault automobile insurance law in New York State.  There were 101 no-
fault arbitrators and 7,100 case dispositions during the year ending July 2002 in a system administered 
by the AAA.  See William Considine, Developments in No-Fault Arbitration in 2002, at 
http://www.adr.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2003). 
 119. I include amateur sports cases as examples here because I am using the broadest definition of 
“commercial arbitration,” including every use of arbitration that is neither labor nor employment. 
Moreover, Congress has mandated that these cases be resolved in accordance with the rules of the 
AAA, and they were originally treated under the AAA’s commercial rules.  See Lisa B. Bingham, 
Arbitration of Disputes for the Olympic Games: A Procedure that Works, 47 ARB. J. 33 (1992). 
 120. My thanks to Professor Richard Reuben for suggesting this example. 
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process.121  An NOC may adopt a dispute-system design or have one imposed 
on it by its government, as has been done to the U.S. Olympic Committee 
(USOC) through the Amateur Sports Act,122 which requires arbitration under 
the rules of the AAA.123  The finality of these processes comes into question 
when a dispute involves international competition.124  As a result, the IOC, 
supported by stakeholders in international amateur sports, created the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), an international body capable of applying the 
rules of the various national and international sports organizations.125 
All of these processes involve mandatory arbitration in that athletes must 
agree to the applicable dispute-system design as a condition of participating in 
the events supervised by the relevant entity (an NSO, an NOC, or the IOC).126  
The processes’ perceived success among commentators varies to some degree 
with control over dispute-system design.  For example, the internal dispute-
resolution processes of the Canadian NSOs, which are designed by one party, 
have come under attack with criticisms very similar to those of mandatory 
commercial arbitration.  Cited problems include the power differential between 
NSOs and athletes,127 the failure to provide a process for arbitrator selection,128 
the arbitral body’s lack of independence from the NSO,129 the lack of athlete 
control over selection of the arbitral panel,130 the secretive nature of awards,131 
and the fact that the vast majority of specialized counsel familiar with 
arbitration of sport disputes represent the NSOs, not athletes.132  One 
 
 121. See, e.g., Susan Haslip, A Consideration of the Need for a National Dispute Resolution System 
for National Sport Organizations in Canada, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 245, 248-49 (2001) (observing that 
as a condition of funding, Canadian NSOs must develop a hearing and appeal procedure for disputes 
between the NSO and athletes). 
 122. 36 U.S.C. § 220501-29 (2000). 
 123. Id.; see also Konstantinos Yiannopoulos, Note, Save Amateur Sports: Protection From Liability 
Under the Amateur Sports Act in Eleven Line v. North Texas Soccer Ass’n, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
387, 392-93 (2002) (reviewing the history of the Amateur Sports Act). 
 124. Bingham, supra note 119, at 33-34. 
 125. Richard H. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the 
World’s Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 379, 381 (2001) (stating that the CAS, established by the 
IOC in 1983, provides “a single, independent[,] accomplished sports adjudication body that is capable 
of consistently applying the rules of different sports organizations and the world[-]wide rules of the 
Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code.”). 
 126. James A.R. Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and Obligations in the International Sports Arena, 
35 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 359 (2001) (stating that athletes “selected for the Olympics and other interna-
tional competition must now sign a waiver form by which they agree to exclusive CAS jurisdiction over 
all disputes involving doping and other issues of eligibility”). 
 127. Haslip, supra note 121, at 252 (“[O]nce an athlete is labeled a troublemaker or uncoachable, 
his athletic career is usually doomed.”).  Haslip also cites an independent inquiry called the Dubin 
Commission for the observation that if dispute resolution is left up to the NSOs, the body that applies 
sanctions might be the same as, or closely associated with, a party to the dispute.  Id. at 265. 
 128. Id. at 252. 
 129. Id. at 253 (“[T]he Centre for Sport and Law . . . has been integral in assisting sport organiza-
tions with the drafting of their existing policies.  This has led to the perception among . . . athletes[] 
that the Centre for Sport and Law is biased in favor of NSOs.”). 
 130. Id. at 254. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 255 (stating that athletes appearing without counsel are at a significant disadvantage). 
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commentator has called for a dispute-resolution system for Canadian high-
performance sport designed and administered by a third party.133 
Commentators have similarly criticized the complex system for resolving 
disputes between athletes and NSOs (also referred to as the national governing 
bodies for sport, or NGBs) in the United States.134  One critic observes that U.S. 
NSOs need more “explicit and uniform rules of eligibility and remedies for 
relief of legitimate grievances by athletes” because “sheer chaos reigns.”135  
Moreover, an NSO will probably not fully represent a contested winner’s 
interests136 because, as a party to the dispute, it controls system design for the 
process used to resolve an athlete’s eligibility grievances.  This is essentially a 
conflict of interest. 
In contrast to these one-party systems, the CAS, initially designed by the 
IOC (a third party in disputes between an NSO, NOC, or IF and an athlete), 
has earned a reputation for independence and fairness, although it, too, is a 
mandatory arbitration program.  The CAS has an independent, twenty-member 
council called the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) 
comprised of representatives from IFs, NOCs, and the IOC.137  These 
representatives sign an agreement to perform objectively and independently in 
their personal capacity, and they may not serve as CAS arbitrators or counsel 
to a party.  This structure has helped foster a perception that the CAS is 
independent.138  In addition, CAS arbitrator panels are viewed as being more 
independent, neutral, and experienced than those set up by sport-specific 
organizations, such as those IFs that elect not to submit to CAS jurisdiction.139  
Moreover, CAS arbitrations are final and binding on both parties, while in at 
least one IF process, the federation reserves the right to alter the outcome of 
the arbitration award.140  Finally, the CAS is viewed as establishing a consistent 
body of arbitral authority, a kind of lex sportiva, because of its combination of 
expertise and transparency.141  Commentators have observed that the CAS can 
provide effective protection for accused athletes in doping cases and is 
developing an impressive body of decisions unique in international 
decisionmaking.142  It has been suggested that Congress amend the Amateur 
Sports Act to replace the AAA with the CAS in supervising disputes between 
athletes and the USOC.143 
 
 133. Id. at 264-73. 
 134. See, e.g., Nafziger, supra note 126, at 374. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. McLaren, supra note 125, at 382-83. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 384. 
 140. Id. at 389-90. 
 141. Id. at 405. 
 142. Frank Oschutz, Harmonization of Anti-Doping Code Through Arbitration: The Case Law of 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 675, 701 (2002). 
 143. Nafziger, supra note 126, at 359. 
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This example from sports arbitration suggests that the problem with man-
datory arbitration is not that it is mandatory, but that the design of the systems 
is too often controlled by one party, who may use that control to shape the 
process in its favor or at least be perceived as doing so.  Systems designed 
unilaterally by NOCs and IFs are subject to substantial criticism based on many 
of the same problems observed in mandatory commercial arbitration because 
one party is designing a system in its own best interests to handle its disputes 
with the other party.  The CAS system, designed and administered by a neutral 
third party, is free from these problems even though it is a mandatory 
arbitration system. 
B. Arbitration and the Internet: The Case of ICANN 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a 
private corporate entity to which the United States Department of Commerce 
has delegated the authority to resolve disputes over intellectual property in 
Internet domain names.144  ICANN administers the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP, or “the Policy”),145 which establishes “fast 
and inexpensive on-line procedures that allow trademark owners to recapture 
domain names held by persons who register and use domain names containing 
those marks in bad faith.”146  The Policy is the product of a relatively 
transparent,147 public, quasi-legislative process in which various stakeholders 
and interest groups had varying amounts of input and influence.  Although first 
proposed by a consortium of Internet stakeholders,148 the initial draft resulted 
from a period of study and experimentation by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO).149  WIPO conducted a “multi-staged and broad-based,”150 
nine-month, international consultative process. Among other things, WIPO 
solicited comments from, and invited consultations with, interested parties, 
convened a “geographically and ideologically balanced panel of experts,”151 
published an interim report, and invited comments on that report.152  Among 
 
 144. Edward Brunet, Defending Commerce’s Contract Delegation of Power to ICANN, 6 SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2002) (arguing that this delegation is constitutional and represents a conscious 
political judgment to privatize the policymaking and administration associated with the nonnational 
domain-name system). 
 145.  Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 149; see also ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (effective Oct. 24, 1999), available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-
policy-24oct99.htm; ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY 
(effective Oct. 24, 1999), available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm. 
 146. Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 152-53. 
 147. But see id. at 168.  Helfer and Dinwoodie question whether the process was “truly broad-based 
and transparent,” contrasting it with traditional World Intellectual Property Organization work in 
rulemaking, which generally goes through additional review by national governments.  Id.  Neverthe-
less, compared to one-party dispute-system design, this process was certainly accessible to the public. 
 148. Id. at 153. 
 149. Id. at 163-78. 
 150. Id. at 166. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 166-67. 
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the stakeholders consulted were national governments, intergovernmental 
organizations, professional associations, private corporations, and individuals.153  
WIPO used a trilingual website, a listserve, mass mailings, and open regional 
meetings to keep stakeholders involved in the process.154 
WIPO submitted the resulting UDRP to ICANN, where there was addi-
tional period of public comment and review.155  Although ICANN’s procedures 
for public participation have been criticized,156 they vastly exceed the 
opportunity for public input when one party designs a system unilaterally.  
Moreover, ICANN evidently narrowed the UDRP’s scope in response to 
input.157 
The resulting product reflects this third party’s efforts to take into consid-
eration the interests of the various stakeholders. As with two-party arbitration 
designs, it has certain hallmarks of mutuality and balance.  The basic arbitral 
process occurs on-line, freeing both parties from imposing forum-location costs.  
Appeals (which provide de novo review) are limited to national courts of 
“mutual jurisdiction,” defined as where either the registrar or the domain-name 
holder is located.158  ICANN approved three third-party ADR providers: 
WIPO, the National Arbitration Forum, and eResolution.159  The complainant 
may select the provider and pays all fees for a single arbitrator, thus insulating 
the respondent from transaction costs; if the respondent requests a three-
member panel, the parties split the costs.160  For disputes heard by a single 
arbitrator, the third-party provider appoints the arbitrator.161  For three-
member panels, however, the parties have input as to arbitrator selection.162 
A more significant hallmark of this third-party design is the fact that all 
decisions are published and available for inspection.163  This provides a valuable 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 178-79. 
 156. Commentators have suggested that ICANN pressed forward on the policy while it had an 
interim board of directors that was not representative of the stakeholders, that it allowed too short a 
time-frame for public comment, and that there was inadequate participation by stakeholders favoring a 
narrow policy, such as the Non-commercial Domain Name Holders Constituency.  See, e.g., id. at 180-
81. 
 157. Id. at 184. 
 158. Id. at 186. 
 159. Id. at 187. 
 160. Id. at 186-87.  Professor Froomkin has termed this rule “a very significant decision about the 
assessment of costs that benefited registrants.”  See Froomkin, supra note 108, at 665.  He notes that 
initial proposals would have allowed arbitrators to order losing registrants to pay arbitral fees and 
costs, and that the trademark bar believed that this was simply a legitimate strategy “aimed at 
lowering settlement values and creating incentives for cybersquatters to throw in the towel,” but that 
others objected it was a “recipe for intimidating individual registrants” at a time when these fees and 
costs ranged from $1,000 to $3,000.  Id. 
 161. Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 187. 
 162. Id. 
 163. As of September 2001, UDRP panels had issued over 3500 decisions, and registrar-complain-
ants prevailed in three-quarters of those cases.  Id. at 187-88; see also Froomkin, supra note 108, at 671. 
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check against hidden biases in the system.164  It has become apparent, for 
example, that third-party providers have a financial incentive to compete with 
each other for caseload under the Policy.165  Complainants’ paying all expenses 
for disputes heard by a single arbitrator creates an incentive to market services 
to them.  Some commentators argue that third-party providers are using 
complainant win rates to encourage complainants to use their services.166  
Clearly, not all third-party designs are perfect.  However, in the case of 
ICANN, information about dispute-system design—namely, the identity of the 
third-party provider—is being used in combination with information about case 
outcomes to compare different dispute-system designs.  This, in turn, makes 
possible a debate about the structure of these systems and their fairness.  This 
debate creates political pressure for the third-party designer of the system, 
ICANN, to consider recommendations for change in the system.167  This is a 
critical difference between third-party and one-party dispute-system designs: In 
one-party designs, there is no democratic check on design power.168  At the 
same time, third-party designs share certain hallmarks of fairness with two-
party designs.  Both differ substantially from the form and structure of one-
party designs. 
 
 164. On the importance of disclosure for on-line dispute-resolution system designs, see Lucille M. 
Ponte, Broadening Traditional ADR Notions of Disclosure: Special Considerations for Posting Conflict 
Resolution Policies and Programs on E-Business Web Sites, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 321 (2002); 
Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business: Recommendations for Establishing 
Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 441 (2002) (applying consumer protocol principles to on-line dispute resolution and 
recommending provisions for fairness and disclosure). 
 165. Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 211; see also Froomkin, supra note 108, at 672 
(“Overall, the system gives dispute resolution providers an economic incentive to compete by being 
complainant-friendly.”); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons from the 
ICANN Dispute Resolution Process, 6 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 89, 121 (2002)  (discussing structural 
bias and recommending that the government play a stronger role in the design and implementation of 
private dispute systems). 
 166. See, e.g., Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 212. 
 167. Froomkin, supra note 108, at 673 (observing that the trademark bar had argued against letting 
registrants select the ADR provider because it might encourage the existence of a provider biased 
toward registrants, but also observing that letting the complainant pick was a serious error for the 
same reason). 
 168. For a thoughtful discussion of the connection between arbitration and democratic principles of 
participation, transparency, rationality, and accountability, see Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and 
Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (Winter/Spring 
2004); see also Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: 
Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1997).  For a 
call to expand a third-party democratic role, specifically that of state legislatures, through more 
federal/state collaboration in furthering national arbitration policy, particularly through state-designed 
default rules from which parties can opt out, see Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration 
Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175 (2002). 
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V 
CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR DATA AND JUDICIAL WATCHDOGS 
If it is possible for institutional repeat players with control over dispute-
system design to use it to manage risk and succeed, then some would argue it is 
irresponsible for a corporation or other such player not to use this advantage.  
Indeed, stockholders might question whether management was doing all it 
could to safeguard profits.  This is another aspect of the argument that what is 
good for the profit margin is good for all of us.  In other words, institutions that 
adopt mandatory arbitration are not evil; they are doing what comes naturally.  
If the result is contrary to public policy, it falls to the legislatures and courts to 
exercise constitutional authority to change it. 
There are two approaches to resolving the questions raised by mandatory 
arbitration: public policy analysis for the legislative branch, and healthy skep-
ticism in the judicial branch.  A combination of information and case experi-
ence may help to inform future policymaking. 
A. Public Policy Analysis 
The problems posed by one-party control over arbitration have prompted 
legislative efforts to control abuses.  For example, some have called for leg-
islation that would in certain limited contexts eliminate the power of one party 
to impose a system on the other and return the choice to both parties.169  
However, in a perfect world, for legislatures to conduct an informed debate on 
proposals for change, they need data.  Systematic observations are needed of 
how various dispute-system designs operate to determine whether those 
designed by one party disadvantage the other.  This research must go beyond 
simple win rates.  One study revealed that a bank won 99.6% of all claims 
brought against it in a mandatory arbitration program in which the bank 
controlled the system’s design.170  This number is suggestive, and many would 
cite it as evidence of a biased system.  However, it is hard to know what this 
number means unless it can be contrasted with a comparable set of cases in a 
different dispute-system design.  The ability to compare results under other 
third-party ADR providers makes it possible to critique, and eventually to 
adjust, ICANN’s arbitration system.  This kind of comparison requires more 
 
 169. E.g., Senator Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 281 (2002) (citing legislative proposals to amend the Federal Arbitration Act or to require 
arm’s length, mutually negotiated consent to arbitration for claims involving employment 
discrimination, automobile franchises, and consumer credit.  Legislative bodies outside the United 
States have generally prohibited mandatory arbitration for consumer disputes.  See Christopher R. 
Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the United States, 28 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 357 (2002); Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the 
U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 
56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002).  There are also efforts to regulate arbitration through state arbitrator 
ethics rules.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution 
Processes: What’s Happening and What’s Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949 (2002). 
 170. Alderman, supra note 1, at 1257. 
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comprehensive and systematic data collection by our traditional civil justice 
system.171 
A growing body of dispute-resolution research examines participant per-
ceptions of and satisfaction with a given process or dispute-system design.172  
Parties may be satisfied with a process based on the limited information they 
have available.  When the ADR process is nonbinding, participants’ judgments 
may be the most important empirical information; policymakers tread on thin 
ice when they begin paternalistically to second-guess decisions made 
voluntarily, with informed consent, by competent adults, about their own self-
interest.  But while information about participant satisfaction is certainly 
relevant and helpful, it does not answer the fundamental question of what 
impact differing degrees of control over the design of the forum have on the 
range of case outcomes the forum produces, a question that is particularly 
relevant when the parties cede binding outcome control to an arbitrator. 
Whether an ADR process effectively implements public policy by enforcing 
law is an entirely different question, but it is critically important when the 
ADR process is mandatory, binding, and precludes a litigant from serving in 
the role of private attorney general, as much of our law contemplates.  The 
importance of objective outcome information is reflected in parties’ desire to 
know the track records of individual arbitrators and their willingness to pay 
private services for this information.  More significant still is the overall pattern 
of awards generated by all the arbitrators appointed to hear cases in a system, 
and what would happen to similar cases operating in the shadow of the civil—as 
opposed to the private—justice system.  To determine whether mandatory 
arbitration undermines public policy, we need objective and comparative 
outcome data. 
B. Judicial Skepticism 
The judicial branch needs to develop (within the existing framework for 
judicial oversight of arbitration) new ways to police systems designed by one 
party.  In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph,173 the Supreme Court placed 
on the claimant seeking to avoid arbitration the burden of showing that 
arbitration costs are actually, not simply anticipated to be, excessive.174  Where, 
though, is it written in the Federal Arbitration Act that this burden should be 
 
 171. See Lisa B. Bingham, The Next Step: Research on How Dispute-System Design Affects 
Function, 18 NEGOT. J. 375 (2002). 
 172. See, e.g., DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE 
CONFLICT (2003); DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF 
CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 
(Cornell/PERC Institute on Conflict Resolution 1998); Stipanowich, supra note 16.  There is more 
published survey-method research on mediation than there is on arbitration.  For a review of 
mediation research, see Bingham, supra note 3. 
 173. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 174. Id. at 91 (“The record reveals only the arbitration agreement’s silence on the subject, and that 
fact alone is plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable.  The ‘risk’ that Randolph will be saddled 
with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”). 
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allocated in this manner?175  The party seeking to compel arbitration must prove 
the existence of the arbitration agreement.  Should that not include the burden 
of showing that the agreement is enforceable, at least insofar as the costs it 
imposes on a claimant?  One of the rules of contractual interpretation is that 
ambiguous language is construed against the drafter.176  It might be reasonable 
to place any burden regarding enforceability on the issue of the costs of 
arbitration on the party who had control over the dispute-system design.  That 
party is likely to have more information about the resulting system. 
Similarly, courts should examine how being trapped in a mandatory arbi-
tration system designed by one party affects the settlement value of claims.  In 
cases in which the cash value of the claim is small, and the shift in transaction 
costs renders it economically infeasible to pursue, courts ought to consider the 
arbitration system a change in substance, not simply a change in forum.  Any 
other result allows one party to nullify public policy as embodied in law.  Some 
courts have, in effect, begun to do this through use of the unconscionability 
doctrine.  Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,177 for instance, reflects the notion that 
shifting transaction costs to make a right illusory vitiates an arbitration clause.  
Some might argue that the claims affected are de minimus in any event.  If our 
civil justice system would recognize a claim for tens of dollars, brought 
individually in small-claims court or as part of a class action by many similarly 
situated plaintiffs, that claim is, by definition, not de minimus, but rather an 
important mechanism for enforcing public policy. 
Policy analysts need access to the data that would allow a systematic 
comparison of private justice systems designed by both parties, by one party, 
and by a third party.  Until that comparison is available, courts should treat 
mandatory arbitration designed by one party with a healthy dose of skepticism. 
 
 
 175. “Nothing is written.”  Peter O’Toole, in Lawrence of Arabia (1962).  The Court cited no 
specific authority for this allocation of the burden of proof on costs, but instead treated the issue as 
part and parcel of a different burden that the party seeking to avoid arbitration must carry—that of 
showing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the statutory claims.  See Randolph, 531 
U.S. at 92.  Four dissenting justices criticized this blending of two discrete inquiries—specifically, 
whether the forum is adequate and whether the forum is accessible.  Id. at 93-94 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  This case is part of a substantial body of case law that has 
been criticized as a misinterpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act. See David S. Schwartz, 
Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Winter/Spring 2004).  Other scholars have suggested 
ways to return to the states a role in commercial arbitration.  See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 168, 
at 177. 
 176. JOHN ALLAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7401, at 
197-246 (rev. ed. 1976). 
 177. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998). 
